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Voting for secular parties in the Middle East: evidence
from the 2014 general elections in post-revolutionary
Tunisia
H. Ege OzenAQ1
¶
Department of Political Science and Global Aﬀairs, College of Staten Island (CUNY), Staten
Island, NY, USA
ABSTRACT
Arab uprisings paved the way for democratic elections in the Middle East and
North Africa region. Yet countries in this region, except for Tunisia, were not
able to maintain further democratisation. Tunisia, regardless of economic
turbulence and security problems, managed to hold its second parliamentary
elections in October 2014, and Ennahda, the party of the popular Islamist
movement, could not keep mass support. A large number of studies have
examined the rise of the Islamist parties as their electoral success in the post-
Arab Uprisings elections by focusing on their organisational strength as well
as their social services. However, the social basis of secular parties in the
region has been overlooked in the democratisation literature. In this study,
four competing arguments, religious–secularism cleavage, nostalgia for the
old regime, negative campaign targeting Islamists, and retrospective voting,
are considered as the key determinants of citizens’ party choices. By using
original election survey data, this study asserts that secular Nidaa Tounes
derived its support from secular people, who, at the same time, sympathised
with the old regime and disfavoured Islamists.
KEYWORDS Tunisia; secularism; voting behaviour; elections; nostalgia for the old regime;
democratisation; IslamistsAQ2
¶
Introduction
There are still so many unknowns regarding quantitative measurements of the
political attitudes and dispositions that would provide a basis for making gen-
eralisable inferences about how Arab citizens vote (Sadiki 2009). However, the
Arab Uprisings have the potential to change this pattern and pave the way for
further public opinion research that could help scholars test some of the the-
ories developed to explain voting behaviour, such as economic voting and
religious, ethnic, and other social cleavages. In general, most of the research
conducted so far focuses on explaining mass support for the Islamist
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movements and parties in the region, and the majority of those studies focus
on either the organisational characteristics of the Islamist movements (Yavuz
1997; Langohr 2004; Layachi 2004; Hamid 2011; Hasan 2012), the welfare pro-
visions they provide to their supporters (Alterman 2000; Hamzeh 2001; Ismail
2001; Bayat 2002; Öniş 2006), or the ideological hegemony that Islamism has
generated over time (Wickham 2002; Garcia-Rivero and Kotzé 2007; Esposito
2008; Davis and Robinson 2012).1
The electoral victory of the Islamist Ennahda in Tunisia in the 2011 elections
was interpreted as another example of the political success of the Islamist
movements in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) region.
However, in 2014, in the Tunisian parliamentary elections, the Islamist
Ennahda was not able to repeat this success such that the party lost its
majority in parliament. Nidaa Tounes (Call for Tunisia),2 a secular3 coalition
party that was founded by the political and business elite of the old regime
won the free and fair elections. The electoral success of secular parties in
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region was not a rare event, as
these either were or had been co-opted by the regime party. What is surpris-
ing, though, is the amount of the electoral support that Nidaa Tounes
managed to obtain in the free and fair elections. The electoral success of
Ennahda in Tunisia and of the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt in the
ﬁrst free elections after the Arab Uprisings constitutes the main focus of the
literature (Basly 2011; Sweeney 2013; Haugbølle and Cavatorta 2014).
Studies that were written before the Arab Uprisings (Garcia-Rivero and
Kotzé 2007; Kurzman and Naqvi 2010; Hamid 2011) concentrated on the elec-
toral performance of the Islamist parties in relatively democratic political
systems, where these parties either ﬁelded independent candidates, strategi-
cally chose speciﬁc regions that could provide maximum mass support, or
purposively did not win pluralities of vote to deﬂect any attention from
authoritarian regimes. Overall, there is empirical evidence at the aggregate
level showing that Islamic parties, either before (Kurzman and Naqvi 2010)
or after (Kurzman and Türkoğlu 2015) the Arab Uprisings, have underper-
fomed in more open political systems.
All the studies that focus on explaining the electoral success of Islamist
movements in various semi-competitive or free and competitive elections,
however, are mute when it comes to exploring the electoral success of
secular political parties. Recent studies have relied on public opinion data
to shed light on electoral outcomes. Berman and Nugent (2015) focus on
three critical issues that have inﬂuenced the way Tunisians voted in 2014 elec-
tions: religion and politics; economy and social policy; and security; while
Berman (2016) explores the relationship between Tunisians’ evaluations of
their country’s economy and attitudes toward the democratic reform
process. Preisler (2015) adopts an alternative perspective and claims that
the sizable decrease in voter turnout is the ultimate explanation for Nida
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Tounes’ electoral victory. But still, why the plurality of voters in 2014 voted for
a secular party in Tunisia is a question that remains to be answered.
Using original survey data collected in Tunisia in a nine-day period (from 4
November 2014 through 15 November 2014) following the Tunisian parlia-
mentary elections of 26 October 2014, this study scrutinises the main
factors that led the majority of Tunisian people to vote for Nidaa Tounes
and presents some impressive results. The timing of the survey is quite fortu-
nate because it was held before the presidential elections of November 2014,
after which Nidaa Tounes gained the control of executive branch on top of its
partial control of the legislation. This is why I believe that respondents did not
reﬂect too much of their joy or disappointment of Nidaa Tounes’ domination
of Tunisian politics when they answered the survey questions.
First, among the various possible explanations for the electoral outcomes
in Tunisia, the Islamist–secularist cleavage was the primary determinant of
the votes cast. That is, strong support for secular politics, whereby a citizen
disagrees with statements on the role of religious ﬁgures in elections, govern-
ment, or decision-making processes, is positively correlated with the likeli-
hood that he/she will vote for a secular party. Second, voters with more
positive feelings toward the previous regime in Tunisia were more likely to
support Nidaa Tounes, given that this is an electoral coalition with some
older ﬁgures representing the old authoritarian regime. Nidaa Tounes
managed to bring highly fragmented secular forces in society under its
party organisation in 2012. As a political party, Nidaa Tounes showed no reluc-
tance to accept the elites of the old regime in Tunisia. Third, Tunisians with a
higher degree of disfavour for Islamists showed higher support for Nidaa
Tounes and other secular parties in the system. Nidaa Tounes ran a negative
campaign, in which Islamists were targeted, and a dominant discourse about
the secular–religious cleavage was adopted, and the electoral results can be
interpreted as a positive payoﬀ of negative campaign strategies run by
secular parties. Finally, the results do not support any sign of voting retrospec-
tively, neither economically nor politically, in the 2014 Tunisian elections. This
is a surprising outcome because the process between the 2011 and 2014 elec-
tions was highly chaotic due to the alarming level of political violence and
negative political discourse that was employed by secular politicians against
the Islamist movement.
Secular–religious cleavage in Tunisia
The secular–religious cleavage has been a prominent characteristic of Middle
Eastern politics for a long time. It was essential that the debate over the
relationship between religion and politics was understood as going to the
heart of what democracy means and could mean in the Middle East (Ardıç
2012). And, in general, the evidence indicates that support for the inclusion
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 3
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
of religious values and norms in politics is relatively higher in the Middle East
than it is in other regions of the world (Tessler and Gao 2005; Çiftçi 2013).
The secular–religious cleavage was not a new phenomenon in Tunisian
politics. At the beginning of the uprisings, the cleavage was safely tucked
away in a dusty box because it was necessary for secular and Islamist
groups to cooperate in order to bring the Ben Ali regime to an end.
However, the cleavage started to re-emerge when competition over
whether the new political system would be a secular or religious one
became a more salient issue. The importance of this cleavage increased
further around the elections held to form the Constituent Assembly and con-
tinued to gain prominence during the late 1980s and the early 1990s.
Before getting into a discussion on secularism, a snapshot of the Tunisian
society that emphasises the degree of individual piety might help readers who
were surprised after Ennahda’s victory in the 2011 elections. Relying on the
2011 electoral results is not necessarily the safest way to make claims about
the degree of religiosity in Tunisian society because it is highly speculative
to assume that all of the Tunisians who did vote for Ennahda in 2011 were reli-
gious while the rest of the society who did not vote for Ennahda was not reli-
gious. Preferably, the original survey conducted immediately after the 2014
elections in Tunisia provides an excellent opportunity to ascertain the
extent of religiosity in Tunisian society in the very recent past.
Table 1 shows Tunisians’ responses to two questions: First, ‘how often do
you salah/pray?’ and second, ‘to what extent are you a religious person?’.
Regarding the behavioural aspect of religiosity, 68.52% of the respondents
claimed to pray ﬁve times a day in accordance with one of the ﬁve main prin-
ciples of Islam, whereas around 25% claimed that they never pray, a clear indi-
cation of being a non-practicing Muslim. At the attitudinal level, 43.35%
claimed to be ‘not very religious’ whereas more than 51% described them-
selves as either religious or very religious.
Another important indicator of both individual piety and the role of Islam in
politics is public support for Sharia law. In the survey, Tunisians are asked
whether they ‘would say “Sharia rule” is a “very good,” “fairly good,” “fairly
bad,” or “very bad” way of governing this country.’ While 7% answered as
‘don’t know’, around 42% of them believe that Sharia law is either a very
Table 1. Individual Piety in Tunisia (percentage).
How often do you salah/pray?
To what extent are you a religious
person?
Five times a day 68.52 Very religious 2.58
At least once a day/more than once a
week/on Fridays/ only in religious feasts
5.04 Religious 49.16
Never 25.02 Not very religious 43.35
No response 1.42 No response 4.91
N 1547 1548
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good or fairly good way of governing Tunisia. Roughly 51% of Tunisian
respondents see Sharia law as a very bad or fairly bad way of governing. It
is diﬃcult to be precise about how Tunisians interpret Sharia law as a way
of ruling Tunisia since one unique understanding and interpretation of the
Sharia law does not exist in the Middle East. Still, the responses to the
Sharia law question indicate a divide in Tunisian society regarding the role
of Islam in politics.
It is crucial to put the increase in individual piety, which became visible in
the number of women with headscarves, and the rise in the number of stu-
dents who go to the Zaytouna University, into a context. Ben Ali’s authoritar-
ian regime was losing its legitimacy due to the ‘dictator’s dilemma’
phenomenon and economic hardship. Tunisians have been disengaging
from politics due to marginalisation, and very interestingly, there are some
signs of a growing number of Tunisians who disapprove of ‘a lack of spiritual-
ity in the society.’ (Wolf 2017, 109–110). It is also crucial to note that Wolf
(2013) criticises the previous literature for romanticising Tunisia as being
modern and secular already, and for overlooking the role of Islam in Tunisian
society. This is why the electoral success of Ennahda in 2011 has been inter-
preted as a surprise by researchers.
Then, the question is this: How has Tunisian society remained relatively reli-
gious despite all the attempts to transform both state and society according
to a secular vision? Secularism in Tunisia has been institutionalised in the form
of control of religion by the state, which is an apt description of both the Bour-
guiba and Ben Ali periods. In other words, both of the authoritarian leaders
have adopted religious policies to remain congruent with ‘the increasingly
pious public mood’ (Wolf 2017, 31). Agrama argues that modern Middle
Eastern states have employed secularism as a tool to reveal their sovereign
power, which serves to ‘hopelessly blur’ religion and politics, rather than to
separate them (2010, 521). Keeping religion under control has always been
one of the primary goals of modern secular states in the Middle East
because, historically, Islam or Islamic traditions played an important role in
organising networks between state and society throughout the Ottoman
Empire (Mardin 1973). After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in Turkey,
and later after the end of colonial rule in other Middle Eastern countries,
the modernising elites purposively disrupted these religious networks and
replaced them with secular institutions. The Tunisian state under the
control of Bourguiba was no exception, given that it used diﬀerent
methods at diﬀerent times to regulate religious aﬀairs in society with the
goal of monopolising any political activity by extending the state’s control
over religious symbols (McCarthy 2014, 734).
Habib Bourguiba was portrayed as the most extreme cultural moderniser of
the Arab world (Alexander 2010). He opposed any possible resurgence of reli-
gion and aimed to shape Tunisian society using a nineteenth-century
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positivist mentality and a ‘triumphant laicity’ (McCarthy 2014, 734). Like other
modernising elites in the Middle East, he targeted the traditional religious
images and symbols in public life, yet, none of his modernising reforms
were enough to stiﬂe religion, rather religion moved from the public sphere
towards the private sphere (Wolf 2017, 26–27). For instance, Bourguiba elimi-
nated religious schools and integrated the Zaytouna Mosque, one of the pro-
minent universities in the history of Islam, into a new secular university,
Université de Tunis. He also changed the traditional law of marriage and
divorce with the Personal Status Code of 1956; nine years later he legalised
abortion. Among the most contested reforms was the prohibition of
women wearing a hijab, which he preferred to call an ‘odious rag’, in
schools and public. Finally, he targeted one of the Five Pillars of Islam, claim-
ing that Ramadan was making life more diﬃcult – especially for those who
work hard. And, on this basis, he proposed delaying the fast, which would
have been an extremely radical step for any Muslim society to take (Esposito,
Sonn, and Voll 2016, 176).
In order to explain the emergence of the Islamic Tendency Movement
(MTI), Boulby (1988) refers to the Tunisian scholar Elbaki Hermassi who
pointed out the peculiarity of Tunisia for being the only Arab country in
which ‘modernist elites deliberately attacked the institutions of Islam and dis-
mantled its infrastructure in the name of systematic reform of the social and
cultural order’ (Hermassi 1984, 40). The main goal of the movement was to
challenge the authoritarian secular regime in Tunisia. This exlpains how one
of the most important issues, if not the single most important issue in
Tunisia over the past four decades, ‘the proper relationship of Islam and poli-
tics’ (Allani 2009, 257) was decided.
When Ben Ali took political power in 1987, he made it clear that democracy
would arrive in Tunisia in the form of a plural system, in which the Islamist
movement could be legalised and run in competitive, free, and fair elections
(Wolf 2017, 66). In the long run, his rule was not so diﬀerent from Bourguiba’s.
He strategically formed a more cautious relationship with modernisation (Wolf
2013, 562), by broadcasting the call for prayer in public television and radio,
reopening three Islamic studies schools at Zaytouna University, and establish-
ing the Ministry of Religious Aﬀairs (Haugbølle 2015, 332; Wolf 2017, 68). The
ﬁrst two years of Ben Ali’s rule can be described as a ‘honeymoon period’
between the regime and the Islamist movement (Allani 2009, 264). The MTI
changed its name to Ennahda before elections in 1989. Following the 1989
elections, rumours that Ennahda was planning a coup against Ben Ali
spread quickly throughout the country. The government harshly repressed
the Islamist movement and, in 1992, military courts convicted 265 Ennahda
members on charges of organising a coup against the regime. The leader of
the movement, Rachid Ghannouchi, lived in exile in Europe until Ben Ali left
the country as a result of the 2010–2011 uprisings. This was a planned,
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organised, and systematic government propaganda eﬀort to present Islamists
as constituting a serious threat to society.
Ennahda was a constant target of repression by the regime continuously
just as the Ikhwan movement was suppressed in Egypt for many years.
However, in a diﬀerent way from Ikhwan, Ennahda never insisted on applying
Sharia law as the source of the constitution like some other Islamist move-
ments in Tunisia or other movements such as al-Nour in Egypt did and
always kept the door open for political pluralism. Even though Ennahda
became a more moderate Islamist movement over time, its position was
hardly stable, which means that it was subject to change conditional on the
contextual changes (El-Ghobashy 2005). The most obvious example of this
ambiguous position was seen when Ennahda started to lead the coalition gov-
ernment after the 2011 elections. This ambiguity is an indicator that there
were diﬀerent voices within the political party (Ottaway 2013). According to
Wolf (2017), the followers of Ennahda have been going through various chal-
lenges and pressures that the regime dictated to them and this is why the
movement has never been monolithic; and this is why Islamists in Tunisia
were also divided on the future and identity of the country. There is also a con-
tradiction between the new constitution and Ennahda’s ‘original’ Islamist
ideology. In other words, Ennahda’s compliance with the new constitution
is a clear indicator of moderation in the party’s ideological position, and
this can be interpreted as a signiﬁcant step towards the secularisation of
the public sphere in Tunisia (Netterstrøm 2015, 122–123).
When Haugbølle and Cavatorta describe and make predictions about the
post-revolutionary period in Tunisia, they claim that ‘the divisions of the
past are still haunting the present transition’ (2011, 339). After Ben Ali went
into exile, uncertainty was almost the only common characteristic that
could explain the post-revolutionary process, and broad fragmentation in
the political sphere fuelled this chaotic condition. The general public laid
most of the blame for this dark picture at the door of party politics, which
was described as the source of potential problems during the transition
period (Haugbølle and Cavatorta 2011).
But still, little is known about how elite and party-level polarisation, regard-
ing the secular–religious cleavage, has aﬀected Tunisian society. People are
not passive receptors of signals that political elites transmit by using
various channels, such as media outputs. There is ongoing communication
between the elites and the people. Therefore, it is not unexpected to
observe reﬂections of the secular–religious cleavage in daily conversations
among Tunisians, which eventually cause the formation of attitudes and pre-
dispositions toward the role of religion in politics and social life.
The respondents were given in total six items regarding the role of religion
in politics. The ﬁrst three items were selected from the World Values Survey
(WVS) for comparison and also due to their extensive use and acceptance
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 7
245
250
255
260
265
270
275
280
in the literature. The survey respondents were asked the extent to which they
agreed or disagreed with the following statements by selecting an option
ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ on a ﬁve-point scale:
(1) The relationship between the religion and the state should be fully
separate.
(2) Religious authorities and leaders should not inﬂuence how people vote in
elections.
(3) Religious authorities and leaders should not inﬂuence the decisions of
government.
(4) Religious parties should not compete in elections.
Table 2 describes the overall distribution of respondents’ support for secu-
larism. On average, support for secular politics was considerably higher in
Tunisia than it was in Egypt.4 For the ﬁrst three items, the majority of Tunisians
were more likely to take clear positions on secular politics; approximately 58%,
86%, and 66% of the respondents either agree or strongly agree with the
statements, respectively. On the other hand, the respondents tended to
favour democratic values combined with a moderate stance on the reach of
secularism. More than 70% were against any measures aimed at the exclusion
of Islamist parties, e.g. Ennahda, in Tunisia. Using an index of these diﬀerent
items is useful for establishing and accounting for diﬀerent degrees of
secular attitudes.5
Nostalgia for the old regime
As a result of the October 2011 elections, none of the political parties
managed to win a clear majority in the Constituent Assembly, which
created pressure on the leading parties to form a coalition government. The
electoral rule can be seen as the primary determinant of the electoral
Table 2. Distribution of support for secular politics (percentage).
The relationship
between the religion
and the state should
be fully separate.
Religious authorities
and leaders should
not inﬂuence how
people vote in
elections
Religious authorities
and leaders should not
inﬂuence over the
decisions of
government
Religious
parties should
not compete in
elections
Strongly
disagree
22.8 5.31 10.91 45.94
Disagree 13.23 4.97 13.58 25.4
Partly
agree
6.22 4.02 9.57 5.19
Agree 24.3 34.26 31.53 11.88
Strongly
agree
33.4 51.43 34.41 11.6
N 1512 1468 1421 1465
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outcome, which led to the formation of a coalition government. Ennahda was
the only party representing the Islamist movement in the assembly, such that
the movement was pushed to compromise with the secular parties. However,
Ennahda leadership has already declared that they were willing to share
power with other political parties even though their party has had the absol-
ute majority. The more established secular parties endorsed relatively new
parties, the left-leaning Congrés pour la République (CPR) headed by expert
human rights activist Moncef Marzouki and the center-left Ettaktatol (Demo-
cratic Forum for Labor and Liberties) party. As a result of the agreement
between these three parties, Ennahda assumed the role of leading the gov-
ernment, Marzouki, the CPR’s leader, was placed in the Presidential palace
and Ettakatol was chosen as the assembly speaker.
The Tunisian public had two overriding concerns: the high unemployment
rate and the high level of inequality, especially among the younger population
(Boughzala 2016). However, given the severe conditions that prevailed follow-
ing the popular uprisings, being able to come up with quick and eﬃcient
responses to those economic problems was not realistic even for experienced
politicians. In a short period, very modest improvements in economic con-
ditions led to discontent in Tunisia, which, in turn, gave rise to political
tensions.
In addition to economic problems, political violence erupted for the ﬁrst
time after the uprisings with the assassination of two secular leftist politicians
in 2013. This gave rise to further tensions between secular and Islamist camps.
Secular parties were already questioning Ennahda’s intentions as expressed
by that party’s insertion of religious and traditional values into the debate
on Tunisia’s political future. They blamed Ennahda for being inconsistent
regarding the claims it made to support democracy and yet its adherence
to a ‘latent’ endorsement of extremist jihadist elements that had started to
gain widespread support after the emergence of the Islamic State.
As political violence escalated and tensions between the two political
camps intensiﬁed, the secular-oriented public started to embrace a new pol-
itical party, Nidaa Tounes, led by veteran politician Beji Caid Essebsi, who had
served as the interim prime minister before the October 2011 elections.
Essebsi started to use the widespread discontent and rising violence in the
country for his own movement’s interests, emphasising that Ennahda, as
the leader of the government, was responsible for the country’s weak
economy and unrest and for undermining the country’s progress toward
becoming a democracy. Overall, he emphasised republican ideals and
pointed the ﬁnger at Ennahda for threatening them.
In the summer of 2013, the ‘poor’ performance of the Ennahda-led govern-
ment and a lack of signiﬁcant progress in the advancement of the consti-
tution-making process resulted in massive protests whereby demands were
made for the government’s resignation. Quite possibly, these popular protests
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 9
325
330
335
340
345
350
355
360
were inspired by similar occurrences in Egypt, where the military, with public
support, removed the Muslim Brotherhood–led government. Civil society
organisations in Tunisia got involved in the process and did not allow the pro-
tests to become out of control. In fact, they played an important role in
keeping the negotiations between the two political camps on track. The invol-
vement of civil society organisations, especially powerful trade unions, was
not limited to this crisis. In the autumn of 2013, there was increasing public
pressure to reach a consensus over a new constitution, and as a result of
the consistent participation of civil society organisations and the ability of
rival camps to compromise, by January 2014, the National Constituent Assem-
bly had approved the draft of a new constitution. Four strong interest groups,
the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), the Union for Industry, Commerce
and Handicrafts (UTICA), the National Bar Association, and the Tunisian
Human Rights League (LTDH), which came together under the name of
‘Quartet’, showed persistent involvement in the process such that the collec-
tive group received a Nobel Prize in 2015.
Encouraged by the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt,
the opposition parties in Tunisia increased their pressure on Ennahda. Even-
tually, Ennahda agreed to resign after providing two suggestions for timeta-
bles, one for new elections and another for completing work the party had
already done on a new constitution. Consequently, Ennahda’s resignation pre-
vented an extended political crisis while guaranteeing that the party
remained a key political player. Ennahda’s decision can be interpreted as a
reﬂection of the search for stability and consensual politics, which has histori-
cally been reinforced in Tunisian politics.
An alternative way to consider the issue of favouritism of the old regime
is the public and political discussion of ‘lustration’. Lustration can have
diﬀerent forms contingent on the political context of the transition democ-
racy. In Tunisian context, Ennahda leadership and members built the lustra-
tion discussion on electoral exclusion of political elites who took a role in
Ben Ali regime (Lamont 2013; Marks 2015; Andrieu 2016). While Ennahda
leadership was more motivated to pass a lustration law that would bring
limitations on former regimes’ actors to run in 2014 general elections, pol-
itical assassinations and the military coup in Egypt brought constraints on
Ennahda’s ‘margin of strategic maneuver’ (Marks 2015, 10). Ghannouchi’s
hesitation on pushing further for passing the lustration law caused
massive disagreements within Ennahda (Marks 2015), which led the resur-
gence of important ﬁgures of previous regime, especially through Nidaa
Tounes (Wolf 2017, 154). When the troika government stepped down,
very little has been done to purge the political system of people and struc-
tures associated with the old regime. The original survey used in this study
does not have any speciﬁc question on the lustration, yet, it is reasonable to
expect that Ennahda’s strategic unwillingness to pass a major lustration law
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might have alienated some Tunisians who supported the party in 2011
elections.
All of these tensions and failures of the resigned government under the lea-
dership of Ennahda created a context suitable for Nidaa Tounes to convince
Tunisians that the country was stable and peaceful during the ancien
régime under the authoritarian leadership of Bourguiba. The leaders of the
party framed their electoral platform by referencing the old regime in
general and the period before Ben Ali came to power in particular. As an elec-
toral strategy, Essebsi and his supporters used his political experience during
the Bourguiba period to convince other secular groups as well as the public
that he would be capable of governing the country. Additionally, Essebsi refer-
enced the Bourguiba period in his public speeches, in which he referred to
that time as Tunisia’s ‘golden age.’ Rather than recalling the single-party dom-
ination and the systematic pressure exerted on civil and political liberties in
Bourguiba’s Tunisia, Nidaa Tounes elites focused on referencing the highly
modern and secular reforms introduced by Bourguiba as a reference point
for criticising Ennahda’s ‘hidden’ agenda and also its performance as the
incumbent party. In this way, they sought to increase perceptions of the ‘Isla-
mist threat’ in Tunisia. Therefore, Tunisians who favoured the old authoritarian
but secular regime of Tunisia were more likely to vote for Nidaa Tounes,
whereas this expectation would not hold for the other parties. The respon-
dents were asked to state their opinion of the previous regime by choosing
one of four options ranging from ‘very favorable’ (1) to ‘very unfavorable’ (4).
Negative campaign & disfavor of Islamists
One possible reason why polarisation between Islamists and secularists
increased in the electoral process is that the general electoral discourse was
unsophisticated and dominated by discussion about whether Ennahda
intended to render Tunisian society theocratic. The secular parties quickly
entered this debate because the secular elites might have seen this as a
golden opportunity to inﬂuence the public. Otherwise, they did not have
much to oﬀer concerning policy outcomes. They caricatured Ennahda to
fuel fears that if the party came to power, it would enforce wearing the veil,
turn back the clock on women’s rights, and destroy the tourist industry by
banning alcohol and beachwear. Ennahda leaders’ attempts to explain the
party’s commitment to the plural characteristics of liberal democracy and
their promises to protect the established rights of women were also chal-
lenged by secularists, who questioned the trustworthiness of those promises
and pledges (Murphy 2013, 238).
Religious–secularist cleavages have some particular characteristics that dis-
tinguish them from other traditional social cleavages, such as class, center–
periphery, and urban–rural. Although all of these cleavages have cross-
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cutting properties, social movements or political parties that diﬀerentiate
themselves from each other along religious–secular lines cannot entirely dis-
tinguish themselves from the other side of the religious division. In very reli-
gious Muslim societies, where secularists are in the minority, Islamists’ main
challenge has always been convincing these minority groups that their
rights and liberties will be secure under Islamic rule. On the other hand,
most of the Islamist movements could not satisfy the demands of the more
radical or extreme groups in their camp while also making promises to
secular groups. This is what I prefer to call being stuck in the ‘araf’ – the
Arabic name for a space between hell and heaven according to Islam. This
is a situation that is not the result or outcome of a choice; rather, this is a
result of preferential constraints that other groups build in time. It does not
mean that Islamist movements have to stay in this blurry discursive space
between modern and traditional or religious and secular. This is where
choices become relevant. In other words, Islamist movements can choose
to radicalise even more and side with more extremist groups, such as the
Salaﬁsts, thus coming into direct conﬂict with the regime – in the Tunisian
case, the regime forces have always been on the side of the secularists. Or,
Islamist movements can compromise and negotiate with secularists to
create a more pluralist political system.6
Further, the electoral context played a signiﬁcant role in the electoral strat-
egy pursued by Nidaa Tounes. That is, this setting provided a convenient
environment in which Ennahda had to carry a heavy burden due to its con-
tested performance in government until it resigned at the beginning of
2014. In other words, Nidaa Tounes used a negative campaign strategy
against Ennahda, thereby further polarising Tunisian society along the lines
of the Islamist–secular cleavage and on this basis delivering additional elec-
toral gains to the party.
To this end, the Nidaa Tounes elites built the party’s electoral campaign on
an anti-Ennahda platform, rather than articulating any clear ideological or pol-
itical programme. Another reason why they might have chosen this anti-Isla-
mist and anti-Ennahda strategy is the organisational character of Nidaa
Tounes. Generally, in Middle Eastern countries, there has been a trend regard-
ing party organisation and formation. On the one hand, the Islamist camp in
many countries does not consist of various movements. Usually, one or two
prominent groups or movements represent the Islamists, and they can be
categorised as moderates and radicals. This is the case in post-revolutionary
Tunisian politics as well. On this point, Ennahda represents the more moder-
ate face of the Islamist movement, whereas the Salaﬁsts are at the radical
edge of the spectrum. On the other hand, the secular camp is divided
between numerous small movements and political parties, which causes a
high degree of fragmentation and eventually electoral disappointment. The
results of the October 2014 elections can be interpreted from this point of
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view. As Nidaa Tounes consisted of various groups with diﬀerent demands,
policy positions, and ideologies, it was challenging to satisfy each of these
groups. Therefore, rather than working on ﬁnding commonalities regarding
policies, the party leaders might have strategically chosen anti-Islamist dis-
course as a way of creating consensus among the many fragments. This is
why this study argues that Tunisians who disfavoured Islamists before the
elections were more likely to support secular parties, particularly Nidaa
Tounes.
Negative or unfavourable feelings are measured by a question asking
whether respondents are in favour of Islamist movements or not. They were
given four choices indicating their opinions that vary between ‘very favorable’
and ‘very unfavorable’. Table 3 shows the distribution of the attitudes toward
various societal groups including attitudes toward the previous regime. In the
latter regard, the respondents were divided regarding their attitudes toward
Islamist movements and secularist movements. For instance, around 58%
reported that they were either somewhat or very unfavourable toward the
previous regime whereas more than 42% were either somewhat or very
favourable. On the other hand, the respondents were more homogeneous
regarding their attitudes toward the Salaﬁst movements: more than 86% of
the respondents were either somewhat or very unfavourable.
Retrospective voting
The socioeconomic and political context in the aftermath of the transition and
around the time of the 2014 parliamentary elections might be the key to
understanding the citizens’ party choices. Voting retrospectively is one of
the main mechanisms of democratic systems, whereby voters are given a
right to hold elected oﬃcers accountable from one election to the next.
There are many ways to evaluate elected oﬃce holders in democracies. In
this study, retrospective voting is conceptualised as considerations of either
economic or political conditions in Tunisia under the previous government
led by the Islamist Ennahda.7 When people in Tunisia participated in uprisings
that caused the regime change in 2011, economic conditions, especially
unemployment, and lack of freedoms and dignity were among the top calls
for going against Ben Ali’s authoritarianism. Therefore, it is reasonable to
Table 3. Distribution of opinions toward various societal groups in Tunisia (in percentages).
Previous
regime
Islamist
movements
Secularist
movements
Salaﬁst
movements
Very favourable 17.37 15.36 9.32 2.64
Somewhat Favourable 25.02 36.97 36.61 10.08
Somewhat Unfavourable 11.13 13.46 13.47 13.44
Very unfavourable 46.48 34.21 40.59 73.84
N 1491 1374 1180 1399
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expect that people who decided to change the political system were the same
people who would make ex-post facto judgments regarding the performance
of the new government regarding economic and political conditions in
Tunisia.
Nevertheless, contextual diﬀerences between established democratic
systems and countries that are at the beginning of their democratic transition
might play a role regarding citizens’ retrospective evaluations and their
impacts on the way they vote. For instance, in another context, in Eastern
European transition democracies, voters, in general, tend to vote prospec-
tively rather than retrospectively (Fidrmuc 2000a, 2000b).
In the economic voting literature, it has been asserted that individual per-
ceptions of the economic situation, both at the household level and in society
more generally, signiﬁcantly inﬂuence voting choices. Intuitively, an individual
would vote for an incumbent party if he/she thinks that the economy is
improving. In this case, Tunisians who developed negative perceptions of
the economy were expected to vote for parties other than Ennahda
because it was the party that led the coalition government from the end of
2011 to the beginning of 2014. However, this expectation is not necessarily
a strong one because a care-taking government was in power before the par-
liamentary elections. Nevertheless, the respondents’ ratings of both their
household economic situation and the national economy were tested to
determine whether or not economically disadvantaged groups supported
secular parties.
The context in countries experiencing a democratic transition is entirely
diﬀerent from the setting of advanced industrialised democracies, and the
theories of economic voting have been tested almost exclusively in democra-
cies. Nevertheless, individuals do share common characteristics and prefer-
ences whenever they vote. Sources of diﬀerences are related to diﬀerences
between countries rather than between individuals. The central mechanism
for economic voting is learning, and in new or transition democracies
voters do not have enough experience to notice diﬀerences between political
parties and their strategies because even older voters are new voters in those
systems.
There have been elections in many authoritarian countries, and Tunisia is
not an exception in this regard. Throughout the Ben Ali era, semi-competitive
polls were held, and as Lust (2009) claimed in her study, the primary goal of
these elections was to determine the clientelist networks that were crucial for
the distribution of resources accumulated in the centre. In most of these elec-
tions, though, the Islamist Ennahda was not allowed to run, and most of the
essential ﬁgures in the Ennahda movement lived in exile. What is striking is
that Ennahda was still able to maintain the networks crucial to its organisation
and also the channels through which it distributes welfare provisions toward
people in need, especially in the southern part of Tunisia. In other words,
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Ennahda is another example of an active and inﬂuential Islamist movement in
the region, and its organisational capabilities and social welfare services might
have resonated with many Tunisians, such that it created and sustained a
good ‘reputation’ (Cammett and Luong 2014). If this is, in fact, the case,
then the post-2011 elections process was the ﬁrst point at which Ennahda’s
reputation was put to the test.
The 2013 Gallup Survey showed that irrespective of which parties they
voted for, the respondents had lost trust in the coalition government led by
Ennahda. Conﬁdence in the government was reported as 52% in March
2012, but dropped to 32% in May 2013, especially after the threat of political
violence by the radical Islamist groups, especially the Salaﬁsts, increased. The
approval rating of the leadership decreased even more over the same period,
falling from 60% to 23%. Another important issue associated with voting
behaviour is unemployment – and Tunisians were living with a high level of
unemployment at the time the Gallup Survey was conducted. According to
the Gallup Survey, 59% of Tunisians claimed that it was a diﬃcult time to
ﬁnd a job locally in 2010 and that this number had increased to 71% in the
May 2013 survey.8 The original election survey used in the present study
conﬁrms the results of the 2013 Gallup Survey. For instance, the respondents
were asked to answer an open-ended ‘most important’ question, and 25%
claimed that the most critical problem of Tunisia at that time was unemploy-
ment. Whereas almost 27% chose terrorism as the most important problem.
Poverty, order/security, political instability, inﬂation, and corruption are
among the other favourite answers.
In light of the ﬁgures pertaining to public opinion, it is reasonable to expect
that Tunisians who believe that the Ennahda-led government was responsible
for these perceived political and economic problems would be more likely to
vote for secular parties. For instance, there is a general tendency to interpret
Nidaa Tounes’ electoral success in 2014 as a victory for secular politics over
Islamism (Gall 2014; Schemm 2014; Stratfor 2014). Quamar (2015, 282)
argues that the picture is more complex than just the secular vs. Islamist clea-
vage, rather, Tunisians preferred Nidaa Tounes over Ennahda due to wide-
spread disappointment with economic issues. In order to capture the
respondents’ views on the economic situation of their households and
country, the survey incorporated two direct questions: ‘Considering the last
12 months, do you think that your household economy (ﬁrst question) and
national economy (second question) became better (1), remained the same
(2) or became worse (3)?’ The responses were recoded to show the directional
relationship between negative perceptions of the economic situation, both at
the individual and the national level, and voting for secular parties. An inter-
esting note on these two variables is that the correlation of the ratings of the
economy at two diﬀerent levels is only 0.26, which indicates that 52% of the
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respondents reported that their household economic conditions had become
worse whereas 84% rated the national economy negatively.
In addition to ratings of the economy, another variable was generated to
test for retrospective voting in terms of political issues. This new variable –
‘political instability’ – is a dummy coded as ‘1’ for those who answered the
‘most important problem’ question as order/security, political instability, or
terrorism. Alternative problems stated by the respondents are coded as ‘0’.
If those who reported political instability as the most important problem
facing Tunisia and who held the Ennahda-led government responsible for
that question, then it is reasonable to expect that they would have voted
for secular parties in the last parliamentary elections.
Survey
The electoral survey data used in the study were collected via face-to-face
interviews in Tunisia between 4th November and 15th November 2014,
with a sample of adults over the age of 18, as a result of collaborative work
with the Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM). The stratiﬁed
random sampling was used in addition to the quota method. Demographic
quotas, such as gender and age, were applied to the governorates based
on the most recent national census data from the National Institution of Stat-
istics (INS). The sample was derived from 24 Tunisian provinces, among which
were Tunis (capital), Sfax, Nabeul, and Ariana in northern Tunisia and Sidi
Bouzid (where uprisings started in 2010), Gafsa, and Tataouine in the south.
The sampling points were selected randomly, and based on the fact that
the sample size is 1550 respondents, the initial distribution was decided
according to the proportional distribution of the population by governorate.
The second decision concerning distribution was made according to the rate
of urbanisation in the governorate, and as a result, the urban–rural ratio in the
data is two to one. Overall, the response rate was 73%; therefore, 2125 house-
holds were visited for a total number of around 1550 respondents.
Research design
Explaining the voting patterns in a given country is of great signiﬁcance.
Further, an explanation of this nature becomes even more important in tran-
sition contexts because party choice in the ﬁrst fair and free elections in
democratising countries is not necessarily about speciﬁc policies, account-
ability, or retrospective judgments. Instead, these elections provide various
choices in regard to the future of the country, such as a secular versus a reli-
gious political system, or an economic development model based on priva-
tisation versus state-initiation, etc. Whether it is a choice over speciﬁc policy
outcomes or over the possible direction in which a country may head,
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choice models are, in theory, based on the expected utility calculations of
individuals, who have idiosyncratic preferences regarding making one
choice over another and the order of those preferences (Long 1997).
However, in electoral contexts, it is necessary to assume that any new
choice is irrelevant to an individual’s old preference order; that is, the prob-
ability ratio of old preferences should stay stable with respect to alternative
choices. In other words, having a preference for voting for Ennahda does
not necessarily indicate anything about the order of a person’s other poss-
ible choices.
The results of the 2014 Tunisian elections provide a natural advantage in
regard to explaining the voting basis of the secular parties. Ennahda rep-
resented the Islamist bloc in the Tunisian party system and the Salaﬁsts
were not allowed to participate in the electoral politics. However, this was
not the case in the 2011–2012 Egyptian elections, when the Islamist camp,
the Freedom and Justice Party, and Al-Nour together secured almost 70%
of the votes. Therefore, Ennahda is held as the base category for the multino-
mial logit analysis, which is preferable to its more complex prohibit alternative
because voters have a ﬁxed pool of alternatives in elections and the ‘indepen-
dent from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property’ is neither particularly restric-
tive nor particularly relevant (Dow and Endersby 2004).
Party choice is the focus of this study such that the survey respondents
were asked which political party they had voted for in the last parliamentary
election in Tunisia. The survey responses and election results were quite
congruent, and the majority of the respondents reported voting for Nidaa
Tounes, Ennahda, Free Patriotic Union (UPL), al-Jabha al-Chaabia (the
Popular Front), or Afek Tunis. They also stated other political parties partici-
pated in the elections. Any political party mentioned by less than 2% of the
respondents were labelled ‘other’. The other two important categories
among all the possible answers to this question were ‘didn’t vote’ and ‘no
response’. The results were estimated without taking these two categories
into account, given that the study’s focus is determining the popular base
of secular parties in the electoral system. Ennahda voters constitute the
base category, as Ennahda is the only Islamist party in the analysis. Table
4 shows the comparison between the electoral results and survey respon-
dents’ answers to ‘which party did you vote in 2014 elections?’ in
percentages.
In addition to controlling for religiosity, there are controls for standard
demographic variables such as age, gender, education, socio-economic
status, political sophistication, and living in an urban versus a rural area.
One straightforward relationship considered in the literature is that highly
educated people with higher socioeconomic status would be more willing
to vote for secular parties in the region (Gümüşçü 2010). Regarding age
and gender, it is more diﬃcult to expect a one-sided relationship.
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Results and discussion
There are two important alternative cleavages in Tunisia that could account
for voting behaviour: the standard left-right economic policy preferences
and regional divisions between coast and interior. While left-right ideological
cleavage does not necessarily overlap with secular-religious cleavage, regional
diﬀerences have a cross-cutting eﬀect. In other words, Tunisians living in the
coastal areas are expected to be more secular especially due to the eﬀect of
uneven industrialisation and economic development as well as modernis-
ation. The control variable, type of residence, either urban or rural, measures
this geographical component, yet, I also introduce a dummy variable that
accounts for regional divisions.9 Additionally, respondents were asked
where they place themselves on a typical left-right ideological spectrum
that ranges between 0 (extreme left) and 10 (extreme right). However, after
I added the ideology variable, the number of observations in the model
went below 400, and therefore, I did not include the variable in the ﬁnal
version of the analysis.10
Berman and Nugent (2015) did show the signiﬁcant role of regional dimen-
sion in Tunisian politics. They found empirical evidence regarding the eﬀect of
regional divisions on religion and politics, economic policy preferences, and
the issue of security in an original survey conducted around 2014 elections
in Tunisia. Having said that, the variable that measures regional divisions
does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on vote choice in this study. On the other
hand, Tunisians who were living in bigger cities at the time the survey was
conducted have signiﬁcantly preferred secular parties, such as Nidaa
Tounes, Popular Front, Afek Tounes, and other parties.
Table 4. Comparison of elections and survey results (Tunisia).
Parties Election Survey
Nidaa Tounes 37.6 35.8
Ennahda 27.8 20.3
UPL 4.1 4.1
Al Jabba al Chaabia 3.6 4.3
Afek Tunis 3.02 3.02
Others 10.8 10.8
Invalid/No Response 13.08 21.7
Note 1: The turnout as percentage of registered voters in the 2014 Parlia-
mentary Elections was 67.7%, and the turnout as percentage of eligible
voters was 47.7% while in the survey the percentage of respondents
who declared that they did not vote was 42.2%. (Source: National
Democratic Institute – Final Report on the 2014 Legislative and Presiden-
tial Elections in Tunisia: https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/ﬁles/Tunisia%
20Election%20Report%202014_EN_SOFT%20(1).pdf)
Note 2: In the survey, Ennahda voters decided to underreport their vote
choice. While it is very diﬃcult to be certain about what has caused this
phenomenon, one possibility is that respondents might not feel comforta-
ble to share their vote decisions due to the political context and public
pressure on Ennahda at the time the survey was conducted.
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Table 5 presents the results of the multivariate statistical analysis. Overall,
three of the competing arguments that intend to explain the electoral victory
of the secular Nidaa Tounes. In other words, only the retrospective voting
argument does not hold in 2014 Tunisian elections context, which supports
previous ﬁndings in the literature (Fidrmuc 2000a, 2000b). First of all,
support for secular politics has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on voting for
secular parties compared to voting for the Islamist Ennahda party, which is
the base category in the multinomial logit regression model. As support for
secular politics increases, the probability of voting for each secular party in
the analysis increases as well. To show this relationship in a more intuitive
Table 5. Multinomial logit results: party choice of Tunisians.
Main variables
Nidaa
tounes UPL
The popular
front
Afek
tounes Other
Support for secular politics 0.129*** 0.0695 0.249*** 0.123 0.108**
(0.0409) (0.0685) (0.0721) (0.0845) (0.0483)
Disfavour previous regime −0.571*** −0.504** −0.0735 −0.134 −0.356**
(0.133) (0.210) (0.239) (0.274) (0.159)
Disfavour Islamists 0.809*** 0.686*** 0.982*** 0.745*** 0.850***
(0.139) (0.230) (0.236) (0.266) (0.166)
Retrospective voting
Political instability as major
problem
0.198 −0.135 0.507 0.0105 −0.0246
(0.272) (0.470) (0.457) (0.540) (0.333)
Economic voting
Household economy −0.359 −0.381 −0.0837 0.0301 0.303
(0.228) (0.391) (0.375) (0.448) (0.260)
National economy 0.636** 0.196 0.383 0.312 0.523*
(0.281) (0.558) (0.493) (0.626) (0.317)
Control variables
Region (coastal &
industrialised)
0.184 −0.417 −0.218 1.159 −0.377
(0.303) (0.507) (0.495) (0.826) (0.357)
Sharia as a political system −0.617*** −0.508** −0.220 −0.535** −0.232
(0.123) (0.222) (0.206) (0.257) (0.147)
Religiosity
Self−perception −0.0813 0.0756 −0.0506 −0.482 0.221
(0.268) (0.463) (0.460) (0.565) (0.320)
Behaviour −1.278*** −2.375*** −0.650 −0.767 −1.309***
(0.427) (0.618) (0.665) (0.723) (0.478)
Interest in politics 0.141 0.597** 0.182 0.222 0.105
(0.166) (0.280) (0.276) (0.323) (0.201)
Socio-economic status −0.158* −0.250 −0.0678 −0.0272 −0.217*
(0.0937) (0.161) (0.162) (0.210) (0.113)
Gender (female) 0.500* 0.386 −0.00476 0.755 −0.308
(0.286) (0.496) (0.497) (0.572) (0.359)
Age 0.00495 −0.0321 −0.0283 −0.0162 −0.00403
(0.0111) (0.0208) (0.0205) (0.0241) (0.0134)
Education 0.0562 0.0793 0.150 0.177 0.0861
(0.0576) (0.101) (0.101) (0.125) (0.0698)
Urban 0.409 0.193 −0.0447 1.516* 0.796**
(0.304) (0.524) (0.505) (0.831) (0.378)
Constant 2.311** 4.546** −3.747* −4.494* −0.0291
(1.148) (1.789) (1.948) (2.457) (1.345)
Observations 549 549 549 549 549
Notes: Standard errors are below coeﬃcient estimates. (***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1) The base category
for the model is Ennahda. Log Likelihood −606.3, Likelihood ratio chi2: 308.0, Pseudo R2: 0.2025.
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way, out-of-sample predictions are graphed for this variable (Figure 1). On the
upper-left side of Figure 1, the graph shows a comparison of the probability of
voting for the two main parties in the elections, Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes.
The respondents who reported the highest level of support for secularism
were not expected to vote for Ennahda whereas the probability that they
would vote for Nidaa Tounes was close to 0.6. Additionally, the conﬁdence
intervals indicate that this eﬀect is signiﬁcant throughout the various levels
of support for secularism.11
Second, Tunisians who had lower degree of disfavour of the previous regime
were more likely to vote for Nidaa Tounes and the UPL. This result is not surpris-
ing for two reasons; ﬁrst, Nidaa Tounes’ leader Essebsi made reference to the
order and peace that Tunisians supposedly have been enjoying, especially
during Bourguiba’s period, and second, he has been very inclusive of the old
elite representing the previous regime within the Nidaa Tounes, which sent
an important signal to Tunisians. Therefore, having a relatively low degree of
disfavour of the previous regime let Tunisians support and vote for Nidaa
Tounes over Ennahda. The graph on the upper-right side of Figure 1 shows
this statistically signiﬁcant relationship, where among Tunisians who did not
have any disfavour of the previous regime, the probability of voting for Nidaa
Tounes is expected to be around 0.7 while it is 0.1 for Ennahda. And as the dis-
favour of previous regime increases, likelihood to vote for Nidaa Tounes
decreases while the likelihood to vote for Ennahda increases.
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities with 95% CIs for Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda.
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Last but not least, the results support the argument that Nidaa Tounes and
other secular parties have been running negative scapegoating campaigns
against Ennahda, which show signs of being eﬀective on Tunisians’ voting
decisions. As the last graph on Figure 1 shows, Tunisians who developed
higher degree of disfavour toward Islamists are expected to vote signiﬁcantly
more for Nidaa Tounes compared to Ennahda. For the highest degree of this
disapproval, the probability of voting for Nidaa Tounes goes up to 0.5 while it
gets closer to zero for likelihood to vote for Ennahda.
Two of the control variables that has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on vote
choice are behavioural piety and consideration of Sharia law as a political
system. Both, praying ﬁve times a day and being positive about the Sharia
law as a political system hurt the probability of voting for a secular party in
Tunisia. However, self-perceived religiosity did not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on voting for a secular party. The respondents who reported praying ﬁve
times a day were less likely to vote for Nidaa Tounes, the UPL, and other
smaller secular parties in the system, while those, having positive attitudes
towards the Sharia law as a political system were less likely to vote for
Nidaa Tounes, the UPL, and Afek Tunis. There is a deﬁnite connection
between the behavioural aspect of religiosity and secular attitudes in
Tunisia. When people are asked how religious they are, they are likely to exag-
gerate the extent of their religiosity, which is why self-perceived religiosity
does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on voting behaviour in the MENA region.
On the other hand, praying ﬁve times a day is a vital behavioural habit that
works to diﬀerentiate people with stronger secular attitudes from those
who do not support secular politics. Likewise, Tunisians were divided regard-
ing their considerations of the Sharia law as an alternative political system.
Therefore, it is not surprising to see a signiﬁcant eﬀect on vote choices they
have made in 2014 Elections.
Due to the low level of support for other parties in the system, it is diﬃcult
to make general inferences about the support for the UPL, the Popular Front,
and Afek Tounes. However, the statistical analysis of vote choices shows that
having higher degrees of disfavour for Islamists increases the likelihood to
vote for all secular parties in the analysis. In other words, supporters of
these parties could agree on their negative feelings towards Islamists.
Having said that support for secular politics does not have signiﬁcant eﬀect
on voting for the UPL, which was founded by an entrepreneur, Slim Riahi,
and the primary focus of this party has been establishing free-market
economy and modern society while rejecting Islamism Chrisaﬁs (2011). The
UPL managed to win 16 seats in the parliament with 4.02% of the votes
and became the third largest parliamentary group. Another signiﬁcant
result is that Tunisians who had lower disfavour for the previous regime
were signiﬁcantly more likely to vote for the UPL, while this relationship
does not hold when support for Afek Tounes and the Popular Front is
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considered. In other words, Tunisians might have more similar considerations
for Nidaa Tounes and the UPL.
Moreover, Tunisians who were preferring secular politics over Islamism
were signiﬁcantly more likely to vote for the Popular Front, which was the
only secular electoral alliance that could be placed on the left side of the ideo-
logical spectrum, and was highly critical of Nidaa Tounes for its links to the
previous regime of Tunisia (Wolf 2014, 16). 12 left-leaning parties came
together and formed the Popular Front, and two politicians who were assas-
sinated, Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi, were associated with this alli-
ance. This might explain the result that disfavouring Islamists had the most
substantial eﬀect on voting for the Popular Front.
Finally, the support for Afek Tounes, a centrist liberal party that stood for
civil liberties as well as secularism in Tunisia, was associated with being
cynical about Sharia law as a political system and living in an urban setting
in Tunisia. This might show that supporters of Afek Tounes were having
upper class and intellectual backgrounds.
Conclusion
The 2014 parliamentary elections in Tunisia are historically signiﬁcant in
regard to making a power shift from one party to another possible. As one
of the most important principles of democracy, the alternation of power
can be seen as a signiﬁcant step in the democratisation process of Tunisia.
What made this occasion even more interesting is that a secular political
party won a democratically held election for the ﬁrst time after the Uprisings
in the region. And, this study scrutinises the motivation of Tunisians who
voted for the secular Nidaa Tounes party and also for other secular parties
in the system by using an original survey conducted shortly after the 2014
elections.
This article explored four explanations about the way the Tunisians voted
in the 2014 elections: the secular–religious cleavage, nostalgia for the old
regime, negative campaign and promoted disfavour toward Islamists, and
ﬁnally retrospective voting. Throughout the democratic institutionalisation
and transition process, the political elites of Tunisia were divided about the
role of religion in politics and the kind of references the new constitution
would make to Islam. Instead of keeping track of this cleavage at the elite
level, though, this study makes an original contribution by showing how
this cleavage inﬂuenced Tunisians’ political attitudes and party choices in
the most recent general elections. As a result of a statistical analysis of the
party choices that Tunisians made in 2014, it is possible to infer that the
secular–religious cleavage inﬂuenced voters’ party choices. As Tunisians
became more supportive of secular politics and less religious they were
more likely to vote for secular parties.
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Second, both the organisational structure and campaign strategies of
secular parties in general, and Nidaa Tounes, in particular, had a notable
impact on Tunisians’ political behaviour and the way they cast their vote in
2014 elections. The chaotic and violent atmosphere following the uprisings
and relatively ineﬀective action taken by Ennahda-led government engen-
dered both a power vacuum and opportunity for the parties in the secular
bloc. This is why newly emerged Nidaa Tounes has been successful in creating
an electoral campaign, which can be characterised by cynical discourse
toward the Islamists and positive reminisce and recall of the old regime
under the leadership of Bourguiba. Therefore, Tunisians who had negative
feelings toward Islamists and positive memories from the former regime sup-
ported Nidaa Tounes and other secular parties in 2014 elections.
Overall, all of these three arguments can be interpreted as a result of a
deep division in Tunisian society along the lines of secular politics. On the
other hand, these results do not tell us much about the future of the
country. It is hard to say whether the secular–religious cleavage will continue
to divide Tunisian society or even remain a signiﬁcant issue inﬂuencing indi-
vidual attitudes and political behaviour, especially as both secularists and Isla-
mists at the elite level compromised on the new constitution of the country
before signing it. An important signal in regard to the future of Tunisian poli-
tics came from a recent Ennahda party congress, where it was oﬃcially
declared that Ennahda as a political party and social movement would take
a step toward secular politics. Party oﬃcials stated that Ennahda would sep-
arate its religious from its political activities Nawaz (2016). This recent devel-
opment serves to heighten research interest in regard to the future of the
religious–secular cleavage in Tunisia.
Notes
1. Cammett and Luong (2014) put these three theoretical explanations for the
Islamists’ political advantage under the spotlight and argue that none of
them has a direct eﬀect. Instead, they claim that the social welfare provisions,
organisational characteristics, and ideological hegemony of the Islamist move-
ments or parties produce a good reputation, which makes Islamist parties
appealing to people.
2. Nidaa Tounes, founded in 2012, positioned itself as a ‘modern’ alternative to the
Islamist Ennahda Party. The leader of the party, Béji Caid Essebsi, is a familiar face
from the old days who also served as former interim prime minister. It is more
accurate, however, to characterise Nidaa Tounes as a very wide coalition of
various segments of Tunisian society, which includes followers of Tunisia’s Des-
tourian (Constitution) movement, many trade unionists, leftists, and indepen-
dents, and additionally former members of Zine el-Abidine, i.e. Ben Ali’s
Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party. Nidaa Tounes was part of the
Union for Tunisia, a coalition that came into existence in February 2013 and
that consists of several secular parties. However, problems within Nidaa
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Tounes aﬀected this coalition and Samir Taïeb, the spokesperson for al-Massar
(the second largest party in the coalition) claimed that the Union for Tunisia
‘broke-down’ due to a crisis within Nidaa Tounes such that the coalition had
become only nominal in nature (Source: Wolf 2014b). But still, what holds this
‘umbrella’ organisation together and also what explains its remarkable rise to
become one of the major political parties in the system over a period of just
nine months, is the leader, Essebsi, according to Ottaway (2013). Due to Essebsi’s
long and signiﬁcant presence in Tunisian politics since the time of indepen-
dence, he managed to secure the trust of many centrist and secularist Tunisians
who had been looking for a powerful alternative to Ennahda.
3. It is crucial to make it clear how this paper refers to the term ‘secularism.’ In her
analysis of ‘secular’ parties in Tunisia, Wolf (2014a) uses ‘secularism’ by giving
reference to the general context in Tunisia, where it is understood as primarily
a binary opposition to the increasing inﬂuence of political Islam since the
popular uprisings started at the end of 2010. Therefore, it is important to note
that the concept does not imply an institutional separation of state and religion.
4. The results in Egypt rely on another survey conducted in 2012 after the elections,
and can be found in Ozen (2017).
5. The decision to use only four of these is a result of factor analysis, which deter-
mined that a single factor underlies the responses to these four items. Based on
the results of the alpha reliability test, the new measure has enough variation,
and the items are moderate to highly correlated (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.60).
The new variable was recoded such that it ranged from 0 to 16, with 16 indicat-
ing the highest level of support for secular politics.
6. These two choices can be characterised as ‘neo-fundamentalism’ versus ‘post-
Islamism’ (Bayat 2007). According to Roy (1996, 2006), Islamist movements
have experienced a transformation, and some of them turned into conservative
political parties because they failed to capture political power and eventually
gave up their revolutionary goals of transforming the state into an Islamic
one. On the other hand, other groups did not entirely give up their revolutionary
zeal and continue to engage in their morality-focused activism. Being in this pos-
ition of ‘araf’ explains the ‘ambiguity’ between the discourse and actions of Isla-
mist movements (El-Ghobashy 2005; Bayat 2013). I think that making a choice
between becoming more radical or embracing post-Islamism does not necess-
arily help the Islamist movements escape their in-between position. This was
clear when Ennahda was struggling between pressure from the Salaﬁsts and
pressure from secular opposition groups.
Furthermore, Ennahda’s main electoral strategy was to portray the party as
centrist, reasonable, and consensus-seeking in the ongoing transition process.
The primary challenge for Ennahda before the 2014 elections was that of mod-
ifying its image toward a more Western-leaning moderate Islamist movement,
which necessitated disassociating itself from other Islamist movements that
either were or were perceived as being radical such as the Muslim Brotherhood
and the Islamic State. Accordingly, the party hired a U.S. public relations ﬁrm,
Burson-Martseller LLC (Tavana and Russell 2014, 8). The party continued to refer-
ence Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (JDP) because of its relatively close
relationships with Western countries and its success in consecutive elections
from 2002 onwards.
7. Just like in all the other parties’ electoral platforms competing in the 2014 elec-
tions, reinvigorating Tunisia’s economy was the main priority in Ennahda’s
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platform (The party’s platform is currently not on the party’s webpage. There-
fore, I used a secondary source: http://www.businessnews.com.tn). The party
even provided concrete macroeconomic numbers, such as 5% economic
growth and a 4% decrease in inﬂation, together with a lower unemployment
rate. There was also an emphasis on creating the conditions needed to attract
investment to Tunisia.
8. For more details on this particular Gallup Survey: http://www.gallup.com/poll/
163943/tunisians-lose-conﬁdence-government.aspx?g_source=COUNTRY_
TUN&g_medium=topic&g_campaign=tiles.
9. To avoid any arbitrary decision on regional diﬀerences, I use the European
Council of Foreign Relation’s report ‘Peripheral vision: How Europe can help pre-
serve Tunisia’s fragile democracy’ written by Hamza Meddeb. The report pro-
vides a regional division regarding the economic production. 10 out of 24
governorates of Tunisia are counted as ‘economic center’, while rest is treated
as ‘economic periphery’. The list of the regions of economic centre is as follow-
ing: Tunis, Ariana, Ben Arous, Manouba, Nabeul, Bizerte, Sousse, Monastir,
Mahdia, and Sfax.
10. Overall, Tunisians who placed themselves on left hand-side of the ideological
spectrum voted for Nidaa Tounes and other secular parties in the system com-
pared to support for Ennahda, and yet, none of the coeﬃcients of main indepen-
dent variables lost their signiﬁcance.
11. To avoid any concerns about multicollinearity between main independent
variables and some of the control variables, I checked for correlations
between following variables: support for secular politics, disfavouring Isla-
mists, support for Sharia, and individual piety. The highest correlation is
between support for secular politics and support for Sharia: −0.2928. The cor-
relation between support for Sharia and disfavouring Islamists is −0.23 while
correlation between support for secular politics and disfavouring Islamists
is 0.1723. Finally, correlation between support for Sharia and individual
piety is 0.1387. Overall, there is no sign of multicollinearity in the model
since the highest correlation between main independent variables is
below 0.3.
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